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Abstract 
 
Major developments in socially responsible investment (SRI) and in Environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues for fund managers (FMs) have occurred in the past decade. Much positive 
change has occurred but problems of disclosure, transparency and accountability remain. This paper 
argues that Trustees, FM investors, and investee companies, all require shared knowledge to 
overcome, in part, these problems. This involves clear concepts of accountability, and knowledge of 
fund management and of the associated ‘chain of accountability’ to enhance visibility and 
transparency. Dealing with the problems also requires development of an analytic framework based 
on relevant literature and theory. These empirical and analytic constructs combine to form a novel 
conceptual framework which is used to identify a clear set of areas to change FM investment decision 
making in a coherent way relative to ESG issues. The constructs and the change strategy are also 
used together to analyse how to create favourable conditions for enhanced disclosure and 
accountability by companies and FMs. Ethical problems and climate change issues will be used as the 
main examples of ESG issues. The paper has policy implications for the UK ‘Stewardship Code’ 
(2010), the legal responsibilities of key players, and for the ‘Carbon Disclosure Project’. 
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Introduction and structure of the paper 
 
This paper reflects McWilliams et al (2006) agenda for additional theoretical and empirical research 
on CSR in companies and extends it to financial institutions and wider ESG issues. Environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) issues in equity investment decision making by fund managers (FMs) 
have become very high profile in the past decade. Much positive change has occurred but there have 
been problems of partial and narrowly focused change and major impediments to change exist 
(Juravle and Lewis, 2008). Improved disclosure has been seen as important means to improve 
transparency (visibility), and hence to clarify the focus of change and to improve accountability. 
However, improved disclosure and transparency can also encourage dysfunctional disclosure 
behaviour (Roberts, 2010I).  These problems can combine and create barriers to change and to 
trustee, FM and company accountability.  
 
This paper argues that Trustees, FM investors, and investee companies, all require shared knowledge 
to overcome these problems. As a result, this paper aims to make explicit a grounded theory of FM 
and of its ‘chain of accountability’ with trustees and companies. This empirically based knowledge 
can overcome major problems of invisibility concerning the empirical phenomena hence contributing 
to improved conditions for enhanced transparency and accountability. Dealing with the problems also 
requires the development of an analytic framework made up relevant literature and theory matched to 
the empirical phenomena and to the need for ESG change in FM. The empirical and analytic 
constructs are used to analyse and interpret the empirical phenomena. They are also used, in 
combination with the empirical phenomenon, to develop a strategy for ESG change in FMs.   
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These empirical patterns and the analytic framework (or theory based knowledge constructs) together 
form a larger conceptual framework for thinking about FMs, their chain of accountability, and ESG 
change. These forms of knowledge make visible the invisible and create new possibilities for change. 
They are used to identify clear set of ‘targets for change’ such as elements, interactions, and 
information flows in FMs, in the ‘chain of accountability’ and in their immediate ‘market for 
information’ environment. They are used to systematically analyse where fund managers and others 
can adapt and change (internally and externally) their investment decision making in a coherent way 
relative to ESG issues. The empirical and analytic constructs are used together to analyse how to 
enhance transparency and FM accountability to clients (pension funds, and other savers) and to other 
stakeholders consistent with ESG change. They are also used to identify ‘pathways for change’ 
within FMs and the ‘chain of accountability’. These strategic ‘pathways for change’ and, established 
organisational ‘pathways for change’ can be used to support such ESG change and to remove or 
reduce barriers to change. The integrated nature of the grounded theory of FM and its clear 
connection to a structured idea of the ’chain of accountability’ (set in ‘investment society’) can 
ensure that ESG changes and accountability changes are analysed in a coherent and connected 
manner. 
 
The analytic framework, the empirically based patterns (for FM and the ‘chain of accountability’), 
and the strategy for ESG change (targets and pathways) form a body of knowledge or conceptual 
framework that can be shared between trustees, FMs and investees companies to create favourable 
conditions for ‘Intelligent Accountability’ as espoused by O’Neil (2002). Concepts of accountability 
developed by O’Neil (2002), Roberts (2010) and Pellinzoni (2010) are used to develop these ideas. 
The paper is part empirical, part theoretical and part normative in nature. The paper contributes to 
‘Management Theory’ in the Van Aken (2004) sense by being based on ‘field-tested and grounded 
technological rules’ and seeks to develop new strategies for change in financial firms based on 
empirical finding and a theoretically driven analytic framework. 
 
Ethical problems and climate change issues will be used as the main examples of ESG issues.  The 
paper has policy implications for the UK ‘Stewardship Code’ (2010) and for the ‘Carbon Disclosure 
Project’. Reform of company, FMs, trustee investment decision behaviour requires more than 
knowledge and a strategy for ESG change. It also requires significant changes in the legal 
responsibilities of company directors, FMs and trustees to each other and to wider set of social 
stakeholders on ESG issues. These would create stronger incentives in FMs and trustees for the 
proposed change relative to ESG issues.   
 
Section 1 presents the analytic framework used in the paper. Section 2 explores recent developments 
in, and problems, of socially responsible investing by fund managers.  Section 3 outlines a grounded 
theory of FM and discusses the nature of immediate ‘investment society’ surrounding FM and the 
‘chain of accountability’. These two empirically based constructs are used to make the FM firm and 
the ‘chain of accountability’ comprehensible and visible (transparent) in new ways. The knowledge 
constructs and analytic framework (relevant literature and theory) are used in sections 4 to 6 as a new 
conceptual framework to think about a strategy for change in FM and on the ‘chain of accountability’ 
relative to ESG issues. These are used to develop improved disclosure and accountability on these 
issues.  Section 4 provides a brief summary of the ESG issues in FM and the ‘chain of 
accountability’. Sections 5 and 6 use these empirical patterns to explore possibilities for the 
identification of new ‘targets for change’. In section 5 the grounded theory of FM and the ESG issues 
are used to develop a coherent and consistent change agenda for all elements of the FM relative to 
ESG issues. Section 6 explores how an expanded information agenda for investment decisions can be 
identified for companies, institutional shareholders, and clients along the ‘Chain of accountability’ 
and in its immediate ‘market for information’ context. Section 7 covers conclusions and policy 
implications. 
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1.  AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR ESG CHANGE IN FM  
 
Section 1 briefly outlines the analytic framework used in the paper.  This is based on range of 
relevant literature and theory matched to the empirical phenomena and to the need for ESG change in 
FM.  This is used to clarify the problems and to interpret the empirical phenomenon concerning FM 
and accountability mechanisms. It is used, in combination with the empirical phenomenon, to discuss 
the potential for change. This provides a more comprehensive explanatory framework of how FMs 
have changed in the past and can change in the future. This provides means to clarify what is meant 
by ‘accountability’ (Roberts, 2010, O’Neill, 2002), and to explore what favourable conditions can 
support (desirable) accountability processes. The analysis links literature and theory on fund 
(investment) management, SRI, ESG issues, disclosure, accountability, organization, organisation 
change, and institutions in a novel way. Much of the above literature has not been previously 
employed in the analysis of how FM can be reformed to reflect ESG change issues.   
 
The paper begins by using literature on SRI and ESG change in FM  (such as Sparkes and  Cowton, 
2004, Gifford, 2009, Bengtsson, 2008) to set the scene for the paper and identify problems of 
transparency and accountability. The paper argues that Trustees, FM investors, and investee 
companies require shared knowledge of fund management and of associated accountability 
mechanisms to overcome problems of transparency and accountability concerning ESG issues.  A 
key source of knowledge was provided by the ‘grounded theory of FM’ developed by Holland 
(2010b) from field research in 2004-2009. This developed prior research by Holland and Doran 
(1998), Hellman (1996, 2000), Arsnwald (2001), Holland ( 1995, 2001, 2003, 2006), and Holland 
and Johanson (2003). The grounded theory can be interpreted within the ‘behavioural theory of the 
firm’(Cyert and March, 1963), and ‘behavioral finance’(Shefrin and Statman, 1985;  Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). The ‘chain of accountability’ linked Trustees, clients, FMs and investee 
companies through formal contracts and ownership rights based on law and regulation.  This can be 
interpreted in a conventional Principal-Agency model and concepts of information asymmetry, 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 
In Leavitt’s (1965) terms, these empirical patterns provide knowledge of four interacting 
organisational variables concerning people, technology, structure and task. This knowledge is 
essential to bring about organisational change concerning ESG issues where ‘organisation’ is the FM 
firm and the ‘chain of accountability’. The empirical patterns and the ESG debate aid the 
understanding of the triggers for change, interdependencies in the change process, conflicts and time 
lags (p527, Huczynski, Buchanan, 1991) in these organisation elements and their environments. They 
are used to clarify what are the appropriate areas or ‘targets for change’ in FM and the ‘chain of 
accountability’ concerning ESG issues. Their integrated nature can ensure that ESG changes and 
accountability changes are analysed in a coherent and connected manner. 
 
The wider institutional setting was an important influence on the evolution or development of internal 
FM organizational order and external order in the ‘chain of accountability’. The external order 
(networks, interactions in ‘investment society’, and the ‘chain of accountability’ ) present in trustees, 
FMs and companies can be  interpreted as evolutionary (Nelson & Winter 1982) patterns developed 
in a common institutional setting (Scott and Meyer,1994). From an economic rationalist viewpoint 
they were evolutionary (Nelson and Winter 1982) developed patterns that are implicit and are often 
hard to change in organisations. The institutional setting creates preferences for ‘traditional’ values, 
norms, organizational structures and processes, and to organizational preference for established 
routines and behaviour. These were factors behind the invisibility of FM and ‘chain’ activities, and 
hence the fragmented change observed relative to ESG issues.  
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These forms of external organisation in markets are  purposefully constructed by powerful financial 
firms such as large FMs and social hierarchies in ‘investment society’ to appropriate excess rents 
(Sampson, 2005,  Kay, 2010) from companies, savers (security holders) and trustees along the ‘chain 
of accountability’. These chains contained many impediments to public accountability and by 
implication change concerned with the wider public interests. Their high invisibility also indicates 
they were designed to conceal actions within FMs and the ‘chain of accountability’. Top management 
in FMs and investee companies, and to some extent trustees, were embedded in the culture and 
organisation of this larger financial system especially the more immediate ‘investment society’. They 
shared the same values, beliefs and interests as ‘investment society’, and were unlikely to be critical 
or sceptical of a change and growth process that brought them many benefits. These conditions 
explain why they were few incentives to change these structures and impediments to change.  
 
A coherent change strategy for FMs and their ‘chain of accountability’ requires increasing their 
visibility and reducing the power of such elite hierarchies. This reform, in part, requires explicit and 
shared knowledge of the organization, functions and processes of FMs and of their ‘chain of 
accountability’. It requires knowledge of key elements of FMs and of their ‘chain of accountability’ 
and how they interact (internally, externally) in a dynamic way over time. It requires knowledge of 
how change has occurred in the past in FMs and in their ‘chain of accountability.  It requires 
knowledge of the primary ESG issues in FM and in the ‘chain of accountability’.   
 
The literature and wider debate on SRI and ESG change in FM in section 2 provides guidance as to 
what the key ESG issues are in FM. Sparkes and  Cowton, 2004, Gifford, 2009, Bengtsson, 2008, 
have identified many important SRI and ESG issues in FM.  Many ESG issues were also identified in 
FM cases in 2004-09 field research (Holland, 2010b). The empirical constructs and the analytic 
framework together form a conceptual framework which makes visible the invisible, and this aids the 
identification of new ‘targets for change’ such as various elements and interactions and information 
flows within FMs and the ‘chain of accountability’, as well as ‘pathways for change’.  
 
FM Top management in the FM firms have (historically) sought to both stabilize and change FM 
investment decision making organization in response to improved disclosure and governance 
demands.  Laughlin (1991, 2007) and Broadbent and Laughlin (1998) provide a theoretical frame to 
interpret this need to stabilize and change the organization of FM, external relations, and the ‘chain of 
accountability’. Examples of historic change in FM firms during 1980-2007 provide insight into 
established ‘pathways for change’ that can help remove barriers to change.  The historic evolutionary 
change process and the ‘pathways’ for change provide ‘targets’ or examples of how FM and the 
external chain of accountability can be further changed to reflect ESG values. 
 
Thee analytic framework, the empirically based patterns, and the strategy for ESG change (targets 
and pathways) can form a body of shared knowledge that can be used to create favourable conditions 
for  much  enhanced accountability on ESG issues. This possibility is discussed using Roberts (2010) 
ideas and O’Neil’s (2002) concept of ‘intelligent accountability’ to broaden the concept of 
accountability and associated processes. The paper has policy implications for the UK ‘Stewardship 
Code’ (2010) and for the ‘Carbon Disclosure Project’ (2010). 
 
 2. PROBLEMS OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING BY FUND MANAGERS 
 
Section 2 explores recent developments and problems in socially responsible investing by fund 
managers.  It begins with a brief summary of literature on the growth of SRI and the increased 
significance of Environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues to FM and others  Many useful 
developments have occurred but problems of governance and accountability have arisen. In addition 
behavioural problems and barriers to change have led to problems of partial and fragmented change 
processes. These problems have been related to the low visibility of many internal FM processes and 
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of associated external accountability mechanisms.  Improved disclosure has been seen as important 
means to improve transparency (visibility), but significant problems and barriers to change can arise 
here (Roberts, 2010).   
 
High profile of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in equity investment 
decision in FMs: 
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI), and Environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in fund 
management (FM) have become very important in the past decade. For example, many useful 
developments have occurred in socially responsible investing (SRI),  (Sparkes and  Cowton, 2004, 
Gifford, 2009) and ESG issues (Bengtsson, 2008) since the 1980s. Gifford (2009) in his review of 
socially responsible investment (SRI) argued that it has developed through various phases of negative 
and positive screening of companies with poor and good corporate social performance. This has 
evolved into a ‘corporate sustainability approach’ which involves investing in companies moving 
towards long-term sustainability by improving their social, environmental and financial performance 
to match  changes in society, and the future market (Dunphy, Griffiths and Benn 2003). Bengtsson 
(2008) discusses how this debate has been much moulded by institutional influences in a 
Scandinavian context. More recently SRI has progressed to the view that environmental, social and 
corporate  governance (ESG) issues substantially influence investment returns and should be  
integrated into mainstream investment processes (see the Enhanced Analytics Initiative, and the UN 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI)). Thus mainstream investment and analysis processes in 
investing firms such as FMs should include careful analysis of the ESG based long-term value drivers 
of companies and of sectors.  
 
Gifford (2009) also noted that shareholder activism was a major theme in SRI. Holland, (1995, 1996, 
1998, 2001) illustrated how this activism was driven by economic aims (such as shareholder wealth 
concerns) in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s and this process mainly arose in the private domain. 
Gifford notes that activism has a rich history in US both for SRI reasons by shareholders pursuing 
corporate responsibility aims and for mainstream investors normally pursuing  economic (fees, 
shareholder wealth) aims.  He noted how mainstream institutional investors were taking on many of 
the ESG issues that once were solely the domain of SRI and using these to actively exercise their 
shareholder rights and their dialogue with companies. In the UK, the UKSIF/CIPFA survey (Winter 
2010) found strong responsible investment commitment on ESG issues amongst local authority 
pension funds. However, Hoepner et al (2009), found that ‘responsible investment to be under-theorised and 
financially successful responsible investing to likely require a specific responsible investment skill’. 
 
Accountability and ESG issues 
 
Accountability issues have also grown in importance with the increased significance of ESG issues. 
FMs have been at the heart of both change processes.  Issues of accountability and governance of 
FMs has been high profile since the 1980s and were primarily concerned with shareholder wealth 
issues (Holland, 1995). FM governance of their investee companies and the accountability of these 
companies to their FM institutional investors was also very important (Holland, 2001).  Governance 
of FMs by trustees on financial performance issues has long been a major issue, but has increased in 
significance post the 2007-09 banking and financial crisis due to the failure of FMs to control risks in 
their investee companies (in this case banks).  
 
From the 1990s onwards ESG issues have permeated both the FM and investee company 
accountability concerns, and have been extended to trustees. This can be attributed to the growth of 
interest in socially responsible investing in this period and recognition of the potential role that FMs 
and their (influence on) their investee companies can play in environmental, social, and ethical 
problems.  
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They have become higher profile because problems of governance and accountability have arisen 
along a connected trustee, FM and company ‘chain of accountability’ concerning the pursuit of both 
economic and ESG aims. FM trustees have faced problems understanding their FMs, and FMs have 
faced problems understanding their investee companies (such  as with  bank business models during 
the 2007-09 bank crisis).  The Myners Report (2001),  the code developed by the UK  Institutional 
Shareholders committee (2009), the Walker Report (2009) and the ‘UK Stewardship code’  (2010) 
have commented on weaknesses in the governance of UK financial institutions and their governance 
of investee companies.  Trustees have also faced problems making FMs accountable. They are 
lagging behind others (especially FMs and consultants) on matters of financial expertise (Myners, 
(2001), and on change on ESG issues (Zadek et al. (2005), Solomon (2010), Kreander et al (2010). 
MacNeil argues that  new ‘UK Stewardship code’  (2010) could still fail to achieve its stewardship 
and accountability aims. MacNeil (2010) points out that the code make few substantive changes 
relative to the ISC code and argues that it ‘is less  clear if ‘comply and explain’ can operate 
effectively in this arena’. Roberts (2010) has argued that improved disclosure and transparency 
cannot solve accountability problems by themselves.  
 
This paper argues that dealing with these related problems requires clear concepts of accountability 
matched to the empirical phenomena and to the need for ESG change in FM. This paper uses Roberts 
(2010) and O’Neil (2002) to broaden the concept of accountability and associated processes.  
Enhanced disclosure and transparency on ESG and shareholder wealth issues can reduce negative 
behaviour and may produce many of the benefits asserted by policy makers. 
For example, the UK Companies Act (2006, Article 417) requires that  the director’s report of a quoted company must “to 
the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the company’s business, 
include…social and community issues, including information about any policies of the company in relation to these 
matters.” 
 However, Roberts (2010) has argued that improved disclosure and transparency cannot solve 
accountability problems by themselves. They can also encourage dysfunctional behaviour (Roberts, 
2010) in the organisations disclosing the information. This can include gaming behaviour such as 
trustees concealing conflicts of interest with FMs, FM biasing disclosures, and investee companies 
using private disclosure for favoured FMs only.  
In the specific case of FMs there are many forms of adverse behaviour potentially associated with 
higher disclosure. FMs can hide key assets off balance sheet. FMs also alter their investing behaviour 
between reporting periods, and they can invest in companies that have ‘hidden’ affiliates or associates 
that break the terms of the agreed ESG ‘contract’. They can argue that they conduct research on say 
polluting companies, tobacco, arms sectors but use the perceived value changes as basis to exploit 
value gain in other affected sectors. This would break the spirit of the ESG contract with fund 
trustees. They can publicly espouse ESG aims but privately maintain established FM philosophy, 
norms and beliefs (based on SWM or fee maximising) that clash with ESG aims. Thus they can focus 
on impression management in disclosure to give the appearance of complying with trustee ESG aims.  
 
This kind of behaviour can lead to the development of a culture of suspicion (and hence destroying 
trust), and lead to an increased blame avoidance behaviour. As a result, parties to an exchange (Fund 
trustees to FMs, or FMs to companies) may not be able to fully trust each other to do what they 
promised to do. Critically for this paper, enhanced transparency associated with such potential 
behavioural problems but based on limited knowledge, can create an illusion of being informed, and 
can  narrow the framing of ESG and economic issues. These can create barriers to company, FM, and 
trustee accountability along their shared ‘chain of accountability’. 
 
An important way to overcome, in part, these problems (of information asymmetry, adverse 
selections, and moral hazard) involves clarifying what is meant by ‘accountability’. Gray et al. 2006  
argue that; ‘Accountability is, definitionally, about the rights of society (or groups/stakeholders 
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within society) and relates to the rights that emerge from the relationship between the accountable 
organisation (the accountor) and the accountee.’ Roberts (2010) used O’Neil’s (2002) concept of 
‘intelligent accountability’ to broaden the concept of accountability and associated processes. 
‘Intelligent Accountability’ involves encouraging mutual  behaviour that goes beyond mechanical 
disclosure and receipt of information and which focuses on developing trust and  two way talking, 
listening and seeing O’Neil’s (2002). Roberts (2010) used Pellinzoni’s (2010) related idea of ‘fruitful 
accountability’ to further develop the idea of accountability. Pellinzoni (2010) argues  
‘To be fruitful, accountability must circumvent self reference and address alterity: it must be opened up to unexpected 
questions and unforeseen claims…‘ and ‘The problem is that the logic of contract is intrinsically self referential, 
preventing any account to and for whatever lies outside the world produced by the contract itself’. ……and ‘Usable 
fruitful accountability seems to demand more than information, competence and independence. It requires access to the 
framing of issues. The accountable actor’s self-definition of issues and goals dramatically narrows the scope of 
deliberation about choices or verification of their implementation’ 
 
The above analysis provides a clear framework to think about what kind of accountability is required 
on ESG matters. A key question remains, how can favourable conditions for desirable forms of 
intelligent and fruitful accountability be created?  Later sections of  this paper  argues that shared 
knowledge used by FMs, companies and trustees and other public parties to information exchange 
processes (concerning conventional economic aims and emerging ESG issues)  is an important means 
to create supportive and favourable conditions for ‘intelligent accountability’ as espoused by O’Neil 
(2002).  In addition, it is necessary to explore what favourable conditions can support (desirable) 
accountability processes and outcomes along the shared ‘chain of accountability’.  This involves 
knowledge of FM per se and its ‘chain of accountability’ with trustees and companies. This can 
contribute to the analytic framework, the empirically based patterns, and the strategy for ESG change 
(targets and pathways) discussed in later sections to can form a body of shared knowledge that can be 
used to create favourable conditions for ‘Intelligent Accountability’ as espoused by O’Neil (2002).  
 
Problems of partial and fragmented change in FMs  
 
The above brief review shows that SRI, the significance of ESG issues, and shareholder activism are 
developing and changing through time in gradual way. Many useful developments have occurred. 
Problems of governance of investee companies by FMs (Myners, 2001), and of accountability of FMs 
to trustees and others (Walker Report, 2009, UK Stewardship report, 2010) have also arisen 
concerning the pursuit of both economic and ESG aims.  
 
In addition behavioural problems and barriers to change have played a role in limiting ESG change in 
FMs (Juravle and Lewis, 2008). These have led to problems of partial and fragmented change 
processes concerning FMs and ESG. These problems have been related to the low visibility of many 
internal FM processes and of associated external accountability mechanisms.  For example, Juravle 
and Lewis (2008) argue that  there are many impediments to SRI in Europe. Despite the abundance of 
SRI thought, the adoption of SRI practices among institutional investors is a comparative rarity.  
Their extensive analysis of the academic and practitioner literature leads them to conclude that (p289)  
‘the mainstreaming of SRI depends on three factors: filling accountability gaps; reinterpreting fiduciary duty; and 
legitimizing SRI by building solid business cases and disseminating examples of SRI financial successes’ 
 
Juravle and Lewis’s (2008) analysis of impediments suggest that SRI (and possibly wider ESG) 
change has been limited and has not penetrated the core activities and processes of institutional 
investors and their FMs. This paper argues that the change process in FM relative to SRI and to wider 
ESG issues (and in related transparency and accountability changes) has been partial and fragmented 
due to the need to focus change on the visible or transparent aspects of FM investment decisions and 
of various accountability mechanisms associated with FMs. For example, SRI change has 
conventionally focused on changes required in parts of the FM stock selection process (in say 
screening, or analysis, etc) with some changes to asset allocation process (avoid specific sectors, or 
adapt specific portfolio aims to reflect ESG aims etc). Shareholder activism has normally focused on 
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fund manager influence over investee companies but with growing emphasis on influence by trustees 
on the FMs ( Myners, 2002, Solomon, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, as we will see in the following sections of the paper, there are many more internal and 
external contextual aspects to FM and its immediate environment that impact on the investment 
process and on ESG issues.  Important contextual influences inside the FM include FM philosophy, 
aims, core beliefs, structure, process, properties concerning the investment process.  In addition, FM 
and trustee activism is part of a more extensive process in a ‘chain of accountability’ set in active 
markets (for information and assurance and for security exchange) all located in ‘investment society’. 
This paper thus seeks to build on Juravle and Lewis’s (2008) analysis by making  the above 
contextual elements in FM visible through an explicit grounded theory of fund management and a 
model of the ‘chain of accountability.   
 
Demand for disclosure and the need for knowledge 
 
As a result there have been growing demands for increased transparency on ESG issues, involving 
FMs to trustee and companies to FM. Disclosure has been seen as an important means to improve 
transparency and accountability on SRI and ESG issues in FM (UN PRI, Carbon Disclosure Project 
2010, Fair Pensions 2010, CERES, 2010).  However, developing  regulation and formal rules to 
improve disclosure and transparency can exacerbate or create behavioural problems (Roberts, 2010). 
This can include gaming, preferential disclosure, and hiding of assets. It can lead to the development 
of a culture of suspicion (and hence destroying trust), and lead to an increased blame avoidance 
behaviour. Critically for this paper, enhanced transparency associated with behavioural problems and 
based on limited knowledge, can create an illusion of being informed, and can also narrow the 
framing of economic issues and of ESG issues. These can create barriers to change. 
 
This paper argues that Trustees, FM investors, and investee companies, all require shared and 
common knowledge of fund management and of associated accountability mechanism to overcome 
these problems of invisibility, understanding, barriers, governance and accountability.  Section 3 
seeks to deal, in part, with some of the above issues by making FM visible through an explicit 
‘grounded theory of FM’. Section 4 broadens the perspective (and seeks to fill the knowledge gap on 
accountability mechanisms) by developing an explicit model of the ‘chain of accountability’. The 
analytic framework outlined in section 1 also provides the means to place the empirical patterns in 
these sections within a more coherent view of relevant literature and theory.  This provides more 
comprehensive explanatory framework of how FMs have changed in the past and can change in the 
future. It also provides the means  to overcome, in part,  these problems by  clarifying what is meant 
by ‘accountability’(Roberts, 2010, O’Neill, 2002), and to explore what favourable conditions can 
support (desirable) accountability processes and outcomes in FMs and along the shared ‘chain of 
accountability’. Knowledge (of FMs, of the chain of accountability, and of key literature) is identified 
as a key favourable condition for ‘fruitful’ or ‘intelligent’ accountability (O’Neill, 2002). 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL PATTERNS IN FUND MANAGEMENT AND THEIR WORLD OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
This section outlines a grounded theory of FM and discusses the nature of immediate ‘investment 
society’ surrounding FM and the ‘chain of accountability’. These two empirically based constructs 
are used to make the FM firm and the ‘chain of accountability’ comprehensible and visible 
(transparent) in new ways. 
 
A grounded theory of Fund Management: 
 
Field research and analysis on the nature of FM has been limited since Clarkson’s (1963) work. 
However, research by Holland and Doran (1998), Hellman (1996, 2000), Arsnwald (2001),  Holland 
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( 1995, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006), and Holland and Johanson (2003) have generated many new 
insights into FM behaviour and actions, and provide an important starting point for this research.  
 
Holland (2011b) further develops the grounded theory of fund management through field research in 
20 large active international fund managers (FMs) in 2004-09.  The grounded theory research 
methods of Strauss and Corbin (1998) were use to process the case interview and archival data to 
generate new empirical patterns concerning a grounded theory  of ‘fund management action’.  Juravle 
and Lewis   (p302, 2008) argue  new  research is required on SRI  and  financial institutions (p304). 
In Juravle and Lewis‘s terms (p302, 2008) the grounded theory of FM is an attempt to begin the ‘task 
of conceptual clarification and theorization of SRI’ and wider ESG issues.   This grounded theory is based on 
a world where FMs have primarily pursued economic aims (fee maximising, SWM etc).   However, it 
provides a new means to think in holistic terms about the FM firm and how it can be adapted for the 
pursuit of additional SRI and wider ESG aims.  The grounded theory is based on ‘in-depth studies that 
disclose information on the intra-organizational dynamics within asset management houses and institutional investors’. 
This is needed ‘in order to understand issues of organizational change, leadership and ‘issue selling’ in the process of  
mainstreaming SRI.’ 
 
Figure 1 summarises the grounded theory in schematic forms. In narrative form the grounded theory 
can be explained as consisting of;  
 
‘A set of connected causal drivers, organisation as fund management (firm) elements and their properties,  external 
networks, individual and teams in organisation, purposeful patterns of internal and external interactions arising 
sequentially and in parallel, in an active investment or value creation process, all leading to  consequences’.   
 
‘Causal drivers; Investment decisions were driven by external stimuli and by internal research as well as investment 
policy.  
 
Key elements, sense making, and behaviour; Investment decisions had routine and adaptive elements. Investment 
decisions involved inductive, pattern seeking behaviour and included ‘sense making’, creativity and ‘behaviour’.  FM 
organisation in the form of structured context and process elements formed a key organisational context for investment 
decision making. 
 
Process in context;   These elements of investment decision process were set within formal internal and external FM firm 
contexts.   
 
The internal process elements included hierarchical and operational elements all purposefully and coherently connected 
to deliver the core FM investment function. The hierarchical value creation elements included inter alia, Board and top 
management organisation, FM philosophy, core beliefs, investment policy and aims.  The operational value creation 
elements included, inter alia, internal organizational structure, support functions, control and communication systems, 
standard risk control technology, and ‘back office’ functions, as well as routine procedures for investment decision 
making.  
 
The external context and value creation elements for FMs consisted of well established networks, relations and 
information sources with other key players in ‘investment society’ as well as active markets for security exchanges. 
 
Properties, strengths of elements; The process and context patterns also included the properties of these elements and 
their relative strengths.  Their properties included order (in internal organisation and network), internal (organisational) 
coherence and external matching, as well as creativity. Thus the existence of all of these elements alone was not sufficient 
for FM success. The FMs needed properties for these elements. In addition, these together were not sufficient for success.  
The FMs also needed high strengths of properties for success.  
 
The organisation context was manifest through the related organisational properties of order, coherence, and 
matching 
 
Common internal FM order present in the internal FM context  was manifest as  FM philosophy and beliefs. The 
common internal FM order present in the FMs (across peer groups) was also manifest within the operational context. This 
consisted inter alia, as FM firm objectives, internal organizational structure, support functions, control and 
communication systems, and standard risk control technology.  Internal order also included ‘front office’ layout, 
structured and highly disciplined ‘back office’ functions. These supported and enhanced the internal behaviour advantage.  
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Coherence factors were key properties of internal context by linking strategic context to operational context. Coherence 
or integration factors in FM firms included categories such as the degree of co-ordination or linkage between key strategic 
intangibles such FM philosophy and knowledge, culture (as core beliefs, shared values) and shared aims (purpose).  
 
Matching factors were key properties of internal and external context linking strategic context to external context. FM 
order  involved  the perceived match of key elements  (such as FM philosophy, structure and process, as key intangibles ), 
and their properties (such  knowledge, order, coherence, and creativity) to FM risks taken (and chosen information niche, 
investment universe and landscape) and to a wide range of  potential circumstances for the present and long term. 
These coherence and matching properties of organisational context focussed FM attention on key aims, means and 
activities in difficult investing situations and decisions. They gave FMs stable ‘shape’ when involved in  internal process  
and during  competitive ‘games’ with other FMs in a volatile market environment. 
 
Knowledge was key property in its own right and was part of other properties (of internal and external contexts and 
process).     Much knowledge, inter alia, of the environment, investment society, markets, corporate value creation, and of 
investment process, was employed by FMs during their investment decisions.  
 
Knowledge was central to properties. It was central to order (in organisation, network and process), to 
‘coherence’ and ‘matching’ properties, and to creativity. Knowledge was the basis for each property to exist and 
to function. High strength of a property such as order or creativity was based in part on its knowledge 
characteristics such as uniqueness, being valuable, being difficult to copy, and high FM ability to exploit, all 
relative to competition from other FMs in the FM’s peer group.   
 
FMs could exploit the desirable characteristics of knowledge via FM organisation in the form of the other 
properties (order, coherence, matching) and strengths of FM context and process. These were central to FM 
success. They formed the key contextual and process drivers of financial performance and were important means 
for the achievement of ESG aims.  Thus knowledge was at the core of FM sustainable competitive advantages 
and relative success and failure 
 
FM Knowledge (assets) took many forms in internal and external contexts.  
 
For example,  
 In internal  decision domains it included  
 Knowledge of  organisation, and process, stock and portfolio decisions, 
 Knowledge of risk management, risk controls 
 Knowledge  of creative processes, behavior in  investment decisions 
 Knowledge held by  individuals and teams about decision making 
 
 In external  decision domains such as the world of companies and stock market, and the world of saving and 
investment services  
 It included knowledge of  markets, companies, savers, stakeholders, such as 
 FM theory of  investee company value creation in competitive markets, and of the  factors (Economic, Social, 
Political)  effecting corporate  value creation. 
 FM theory of market  processing of information and of behaviour of other investors 
 FM Theories of stock market price behaviour and about price regularities In stock market 
 
This knowledge was developed in the case FMs during the investment decision making (routine and creative) 
process and longer term learning (Holland, 2009). The knowledge of internal and external contexts was in part 
‘owned’ as intangible assets by FMs as individuals, teams and firms. This can be interpreted as human, structural 
and relational forms of intellectual capital (Meritum, 2002).  Such knowledge existed as cognitive states in 
individuals, as a property of FM context and process, and as formal FM firm knowledge about such knowledge 
and how to use it. The knowledge existed formally in the case FM firms' training manuals and information 
systems and informally in  the experience and cognitive skills of FMs and external parties.   
 
The Knowledge intensive context and the Organisational context (order, coherence, matching), were 
major influences on process 
 
Context was a major influence on process. The (knowledge intensive, order, coherence, matching)  properties of 
context and process mediated and moderated interpretation of stimuli and the production of information in the 
FM during investment decision making.   More specifically, these forms of FM organisational order, external 
network order and markets,  and their knowledge and other properties (coherence and matching) collectively 
provided a focus and a stable structure for routine information production and investment decision making by 
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FMs. They provided the stable context for active and opportunistic information production and investment 
decision making at individual FM and team levels within FM firms. They also formed the base from which to 
develop creativity. They were the active means to control risk and generate returns and liquidity during such 
decisions.   
 
Purposeful investment actions and knowledge based Interactions; as dynamic processes 
 
These FM elements (of firm context and process and their properties of knowledge, order, and creativity) all 
purposefully interacted as collective and integrated FM organisational means (w ith each other and with 
characteristics of individuals) to help FM individuals and teams to reduce the complexity of new information 
flows, to focus their analysis, to find new ideas, and to ‘make sense’ of this information. The combined elements 
also interacted to help FMs avoid their own negative behaviour, to exploit the behaviour of others, to perceive 
value and manage risk.  
 
Consequences and outcomes; This purposeful, interactive decision system was the basis to marginally alter the 
perceived odds in the FM’s favour and to take informed investment decisions (stock and portfolio) with a degree 
of confidence. They were the means to produce portfolios with the desired financial characteristics, take other 
observable actions, and produce financial performance. The higher the strengths of the properties of context and 
process then the higher the perceived quality of decision making information expected to be produced, and the 
more focussed the FM investment behaviour. These were expected to lead to a higher quality of expected 
investment decisions, more robust portfolios, and higher expected FM FP relative to benchmarks. Hence they 
were the perceived means to achieve the desired levels of risk, return and liquidity for the investment service 
offered by the FM to customers (trustees, clients, small investors etc). These were also the means to produce a 
value creation narrative and performance measures to satisfy the information needs of the users of FM produced 
financial services.   
 
Weaknesses and problems; 
Patterns were also revealed for weaknesses and problems in the above.  Thus the combined elements, with 
extensive properties and high strengths (weaknesses), interacted to improve (reduce) asset quality, FM 
performance, and FM disclosure quality. This also improved (reduced) the effectiveness of FM firm wide 
information and financial intermediation processes in FMs and increased (reduced) the flow of investment funds 
into the FM.’ 
 
 
The Holland (2011b) paper thus offers new ways of thinking about FM investment processes and 
performance. It also offers the opportunity to use the grounded theory to rethink orthodox approaches 
to changing FM to reflect ESG issues. 
. 
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Figure 1          Empirical patterns in internal FM context and process elements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘chain of accountability’: 
 
A key to understanding and explaining  FM decision making lies in clearly locating FMs in the 
external environment of their immediate  ‘investment society’. Figure 2 illustrates a structured idea of 
FM roles on their ‘chain of accountability’ in their immediate external environment. This chain links 
Trustees, clients, FMs and investee companies in an ordered way through formal contracts and 
ownership rights based on law and regulation.  This makes visible the many invisible aspects of the 
immediate FM context. This chain also linked the various information and transaction markets for the 
supply of FM funds and for the investment of these funds. There is much ‘organisation’ or order in 
this immediate external environment of ‘investment society’. This includes the individual 
organisations with their specialised information production and use roles.  Various ‘chains of 
accountability’ connected key participants. Thus fund trustees, FMs and companies were linked in a 
clear ‘chain of accountability’. Companies, auditors and FMs were linked in another ‘chain’, as were 
companies, the financial media, campaigners and citizens. Links between these chains created a 
larger network or form of organisation and order in this environment.  All of these participants 
operated in a common regulatory and institutional order. This external organisation, in the form of 
specialised roles, chains and networks created the means to produce and exchange many novel 
information and assurance ‘products’ in the ‘market for information’. These supported funding and 
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investment decisions such those of trustees with fund managers and those of fund managers with 
companies. 
 
In a conventional Principal-Agency model, high quality disclosure and information flows between 
companies and FMs, and between FMs and trustees were essential to overcome problems. They 
helped to overcome or reduce the information asymmetry (and the potential for adverse selection and 
moral hazard) between Trustees and FM investors, FM investors and companies, and companies and 
markets. This provided additional comfort and enhanced understanding and confidence to market 
participants 
 
Figure2          Empirical patterns in external FM context – Investment Society   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The external order (networks, interactions in ‘investment society’, and the ‘chain of accountability’ ) 
present in the context of the case FMs can be  interpreted as evolutionary (Nelson & Winter 1982) 
patterns developed in a common institutional setting (Scott and Meyer,1994). The evolutionary 
development of the external ‘chain of accountability’ reflected the need to transact in a predictable 
manner, and the modifying influence of actors such as FMs and their wider institutional setting.  This 
form of external organisation has been created for the production of information and assurance, and 
for their use in investment and accountability decisions. These joint FM and environmental patterns 
are often hard to change and may have developed as defensive mechanisms to deal with threats to 
stability and order  (Nelson and Winter, 1992). The institutional setting and  City of  London ‘club’ 
(or highly networked) environment has made it easy and necessary for Trustees (clients), FMs and 
companies to use  close  relations  and private interactions as their  'normal'  transacting  means ( for 
information exchange and finance flows). The institutional environment provides templates for 
Trustee, FM, and company joint roles as principal and agents with each other and for their two way 
influence and accountability processes.  It treats organisations that have these structures and 
functions, and uses them as by definition more legitimate than others (Meyer,1994, p122). Thus the 
stable organising of Trustee-FM relations, and FM-Company relations (on the ‘chain of 
accountability’), the private interactions between these parties, and their role in governance, 
accountability and disclosure, requires and results from external legitimisation.     
 
These constructs and empirical patterns for the immediate FM decision environment can be 
combined with the grounded theory of FM (in section 4) to highlight where change can take place 
with FMs and in their immediate ‘investment society’ to reflect ESG issues. The integrated nature of 
the grounded theory of FM and its clear connection to structured ideas of the ‘chain of accountability’ 
and  of ‘investment society’ can ensure that ESG changes are analysed in a coherent and connected 
manner. 
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4.  WHAT THE ESG ISSUES ARE IN FM  AND THE ‘CHAIN’ 
 
The literature and wider debate on SRI and ESG change in FM in section 2 has provided guidance as 
to what the key ESG issues are in FM. For example, authors such as Sparkes and  Cowton, 2004, 
Gifford, 2009, Bengtsson, 2008, have identified many important SRI and ESG issues in FM. ESG 
issues were also identified in FM cases in 2004-09 field research (Holland, 2010b).  This section 
provides a brief summary.  Ethical issues in FM, and climate change issues in FM investment will be 
used as the main examples of ESG issues. This section also demonstrates how these issues are 
becoming increasingly important and significant for FMs, their clients and investee companies. They 
have to develop explicit strategies to deal with these new pressures and increase in perceived risks 
(eg see Foreign and Colonial, Railpen websites 2010 etc). 
 
ESG issues in FM  - using  ethical problems as examples.  
 
In Tables 1 and 2 the empirical patterns based on the grounded theory of FM and the ‘chain of 
accountability’ are used to classify ethical issues in a coherent and systematic way. These tables show 
that many ethical issues exist within the FM firm and on the ‘chain of accountability’. The table 
illustrates that they are well distributed throughout FMs at all levels of context and process. This 
shows the pervasiveness and significance of ethical issues in FM and its immediate environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESG issues in  FMs and the ‘chain of accountability’ - using  climate change issues as examples 
Table 1   FMs and Ethics - examples of key issue areas    in the internal  FM process 
 
Strategic areas 
 Creative accounting for FM performance 
 FM employees take bulk of investment benefits but not risks 
Operational areas 
 Fraud in back office accounting,  auditing etc  
Investment decision process 
 Manipulate / bias information in stock selection 
 Team members ‘obey orders’ of team superiors despite own doubts  – and ‘misbehave’ 
relative to client and saver needs, and agreed contracts. 
Market trading areas 
 Churning,  Fraud 
 Insider Dealing 
 Trading client funds for own FM benefit – firm or individual 
 Exploit carbon trading for wealth gain only rather than promote ESG issues 
In the external chain of accountability - Interactions with clients and investors 
 Taking risks beyond that agreed with clients 
 Exaggerated Promises 
 Misleading investor Prospectus 
Table 2   FMs and Ethics - examples of key issue areas     in the internal FM context 
 
Strategic areas 
 No explicit ethical policy for FM  
 Top Management FM pursue ‘greed is good’ = SWM or fee maximisers only 
 Weak ethical ‘tone at top’ 
Operational areas 
 Weak auditing and risk control systems  
Investment decision process 
 FM ethical code of conduct or policy not part of process  
Market trading areas 
 Codes for PSI, insider dealing not disseminated, not understood etc 
In the external  chain of accountability – context for interactions with clients and investors 
 Main context = FM as fee maximising business  
 This creates conflicts of interest (COI) with provision of investing services 
 Excess wealth demands  by shareholders –creating firm level risks (eg banks)  
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The aim of this sub section is to use climate change concerns to illustrate that ESG issues are 
becoming increasingly important for FMs and their ‘chain of accountability’ and are major source of 
perceived risk. 
 
FMs operational activities are not directly affected by climate change issues at present and these 
issues do not normally arise directly within the FM firm. This may change as questions are 
increasingly being raised about the energy intensive nature of modern office work. However, FM’s 
investment decision making activities and their impact on carbon management in companies is a 
major focus of the climate change debate in the wider political, social and environment surrounding 
FMs. These change pressures includes the growing evidence for climate change per se, and the 
growing actions of governments, world regional bodies such as the EC, and global bodies such as the 
UN, all taking direct and coordinated action on climate change matters. 
 
These pressure have begun to permeate FM’s more immediate ‘investment society’ or external places 
(markets, networks) for investment action and for funding supply. They are having a direct impact on 
the ‘chain of accountability’. More specifically, climate change signals and pressures are growing in 
the FMs immediate investment environment concerning various (information and transaction) 
markets for the supply of FM funds and for investment of these funds.  This includes development of 
new information sources on climate change issues in major industries, and on corporate and FM 
responses. It includes an increasing market debate on the impact on climate change on the value of 
companies. These are all intensifying the market pressures on FMs and companies and on the ‘chain 
of accountability’.   
 
For example, one key development has involved external bodies or lobbyists developing ideas of ‘eco 
efficiency’ which seek to combine ideas of the company business model and of the carbon cycle and 
energy processes. Two examples (of the emerging literature, new information sources, and active 
lobbyists) in this area are the Wuppertal Institute and the ‘Carbon Disclosure project’. The Wuppertal 
Institute has been a leader in this area. Their ‘Factor 4’ analysis (2010) shows how companies can 
change their business models to change their eco-efficiency. Their analyses consider how to improve 
resource productivity by minimising the input of natural resources while enhancing the economic 
output and well-being. The ‘Carbon Disclosure project’(2010) works with companies and 
institutional shareholders to improve carbon management and carbon disclosure (greenhouse gas 
emissions) in investee companies. At least 450 UK based institutional investors and their FMs aim to 
influence investee companies to reduce emissions and energy use when adapting their business model 
over time.  
 
As a result, climate change signals and pressures are growing along the ‘chain of accountability’ with 
the FM facing a ‘squeeze’ in the middle between investee companies and clients or trustees (CERES 
2010, Fair Pensions 2009). These climate change signals and pressures are starting to have indirect 
impact on FMs at all levels of FM structure, process and properties. However, much of the processes 
and interactions (investment, disclosure, accountability and governance) on the specialised ‘Chain of 
accountability’ are invisible to participant in the larger social context and to civil society. The 
processes are primarily conducted to reflect the interests of investment society. They are conducted 
outside of the gaze of civil society and the latter has limited influence in this private and invisible 
world. These forms of external organisation in markets are  purposefully constructed by powerful 
financial firms and social hierarchies in ‘investment society’ to appropriate excess rents (Sampson, 
2005,  Kay, 2010) from companies, savers (security holders) and trustees along the ‘chain of 
accountability’. These chains contain many impediments to public accountability and by implication 
change concerned with the wider public interests.  In contrast, this paper makes FM investment 
decision making and the specialised investment ‘chain of accountability’ set in ‘investment society’ 
much more visible to larger civil society and its wider accountability mechanisms.  These constructs 
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are used to provide a clear set of conceptual targets to systematically analyse how fund managers can 
adapt and change in their immediate environment in a coherent way relative to ESG issues. 
 
The following table 3 provides examples of climate change issues arising on the ‘chain of 
accountability’. These changes affect client trustees and investee companies and these have a further 
impact on FM. Many issues are involved and their impacts are well distributed throughout FM. This 
shows the pervasiveness and significance of climate change issues for FM.  Thus whether climate 
change has a material impact on shareholder value or not, FMs still have to satisfy clients, deal with 
problematic investees companies, respond to the lobby, and deal with their own conscience on these 
matters. Climate change issues, arising in the investment and accountability chain with clients and 
investments, create many risks, perceived and actual, for the FM firm and for its portfolio of 
investments. Table 4 summarises many of these risks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3                       Risks arising on the ‘Chain of accountability’ 
 
            Investee companies directly affected by climate change  
 Investee companies increasingly face climate related pressures on 
 Resources, carbon energy sources, carbon energy intensity use in  production etc  
 As well as more volatile and extreme weather (Floods, freezes, droughts etc) 
 As well as increasing (inter) government pressures – on carbon emission reductions and caps, 
and carbon emission disclosure 
 
                 Clients directly affected by climate change  
 Key Clients (pension funds, insurance companies)  and consultants 
 face pressures from lobbyists, from Governments, UN and & inter governmental bodies  to 
influence FMs  and companies 
 These key clients eg Pensions funds put pressure on FMs to respond 
 Via surveys, direct calls for actions 
 This creates further FM risk of losing funds and  fees business 
 Majority  clients (56%) still do not do this 
 But of great interest to influential small % -(Fair Pensions Report, October 2009) 
 
Table 4                               Climate change Risks 
 
                           FM firm risks from climate change issues  
 FMs more concerned about  investee company litigation risk or regulatory risk linked to 
climate change – which may be then extended to clients and FMs as trustees and owners 
 FMs less concerned about climate change per se when deciding whether to invest in a 
company. (Ceres survey  Jan 2010) 
 FMs more concerned about own reputation risk with clients and savers etc arising from CC 
risks 
 FMs may face regulation (National, global co-ordinated)  to disclose their plans to explain their 
views of climate change risks, of opportunities & their role in carbon reduction of investee 
companies. 
 
                  FM portfolio risks from climate change issues 
 These pressures can have more indirect impact on FM exposures to risk in key sectors, and on 
their overall portfolio  
 Increase in perceived systemic risk – For example, this can reduce opportunities for FM 
diversification 
 Key Question  is what is the value significance of above?  
 Many FMs may perceive that only few of above issues have material impact on the value of 
company investments (Ceres survey of FM Jan2010) at present 
 and FMs argue it is difficult to identify key sectors at risk  (Fair Pensions Report, October 
2009)  
 Thus FMs ignore, or down play these issues in investment decisions? At present. 
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5.      CHANGES IN THE FM FIRM TO REFLECT ESG ISSUES 
 
This paper argues that the current activity and proposals concerning ESG related changes in FM 
(Gifford, 2009, ‘Fair Pensions’, 2009, CERES, 2010, UKSIF/CIPFA, 2010) should be co-ordinated 
based on an explicit model of FM and of its ‘chain of accountability’ in immediate ‘investment 
society’.  The paper also argues for a more comprehensive and coherent change agenda based on the 
new conceptual frame. Sections 6 and 7 illustrate how this can be done. 
 
Sections 5 and 6 develop a systematic strategy for change concerning ESG issues in FM and its 
immediate accountability environment. These sections use the above empirical patterns to explore 
possibilities for the identification of new ‘targets for change’ such as elements, interactions and 
information flows within FMs and the ‘chain of accountability’. The empirical patterns provide 
knowledge of interacting organisational variables concerning people, technology, structure and task 
(Leavitt, 1965) in  FM  and the ‘chain of accountability’. They provide the means to understand the 
triggers for change, interdependencies in the change process, conflicts and time lags (p527, 
Huczynski, Buchanan, 1991) in these organisation elements and their environments. They help 
clarify what are the appropriate areas or ‘targets for change’ in FM and the ‘chain of accountability’ 
concerning ESG issues. Their integrated nature can ensure that ESG changes are analysed in a 
coherent and connected manner.  It should be noted that reform of company, FMs, trustee investment 
decision behaviour, in the way suggested in this paper, requires more than knowledge. It also requires 
significant changes in the legal responsibilities of company directors, FMs and trustees to each other 
and a wider set of social stakeholders on ESG issues. These changes would create stronger incentives 
in FMs and trustees for change relative to ESG issues. 
 
In this section 5 the grounded theory of FM and  the ESG issues are used to analyse how to develop a 
coherent and consistent ESG change and transparency change agenda for all elements of the FM 
relative to ESG issues. This section uses the grounded theory of FM to develop a strategy to adapt 
context, process, and properties to ESG issues. The initial targets for change consist of changes to 
elements of the external and internal strategic context. This is followed by changes to properties, 
operational context and then decision process. This adoption of this sequence or organisational 
‘pathway for change’ can ensure that ESG issues will permeate all aspects of FM and their dynamic 
interactions. These changes should all reflect the FM trade–off or balance sought between 
shareholder wealth maximising (SWM) and ESG aims and agenda. In a world of perceived increased 
ESG risks, enhancing FM order and routine (Nelson and Winter, 1982) to embed rules and screening 
routines concerning ESG issues were expected to improve FMs chances of achieving expected Beta 
returns. Creativity in information production and investment decision making based on special 
understanding of the impact of ESG issues on value was expected to be a source of alpha out-
performance. Trading in the shares and direct and active FM engagement with such firms (on the 
links between ESG issues and value, using the novel information) were expected to be the routes to 
enhanced alpha generation.   
 
FM top management could begin their strategy for ESG change by analysing their external context. 
They could begin to actively monitor developments in a changing public consensus on ESG issues 
and to the public debate and call for change in EU and UN bodies. They could explore how their 
institutional setting is changing. For example they could probe how City of London and Wall Street 
values are changing to reflect ESG issues and public sentiment.  The actions and reports of bodies 
such as CERES, RailPen, UKSIF etc are now very visible in ‘investment society’ and the wider 
public domain and these challenge FMs to change.  FMs could explore how regulation on ethical and 
climate change issues was being reflected in new external codes for FMs such as the new UN 
Principles for Responsible Investment (2006). 
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Changes in the internal strategic context 
FM top management could then consider changes to their own internal strategic context. They  
could use existing and emerging external codes  of  conduct for  ethical  behaviour and climate 
change  as the formal means to analyse how to alter FMs aims and philosophy in way consistent with 
ESG issues. Those FMs with high awareness of these issues and the public debate are in a position to 
begin to adapt and develop own FM culture, values, norms and beliefs via leadership from the top.  
 
In the case FMs (Holland, 2010b), the role of FM firm aims and core agenda for action were essential 
in organising sense making and meaning (Weick (1979, 1995). Shareholder wealth maximising 
(SWM) aims dominated the thinking of the case FM in areas such as information search and the 
investment decision making agenda. This was moderated by other economic aims where the FM 
pursued the maximisation of fee income and an active agenda of marketing and promotion to increase 
the size of funds under management. A trade-off between these economic aims and their action 
agendas was common practice in each FM.  
 
In the 1990s, little FM attention was paid to environmental, social responsibility aims, with more 
formal attention being paid to corporate governance issues and SWM aims (Holland, 2001). However 
increased pressure along the ‘chain of accountability’ from bodies such as pension fund clients has 
raised the profile of  ESG issues. The 2007-09 financial crisis has helped by questioning the wider 
public (good) function of FMs.  UK pensions funds have used the UKSIF  (Winter, 2010) survey to 
publicise the extent to which FM firms were aware of ESG issues. These pressures have increased 
FMs incentives to adapt their own FM culture, values, norms and beliefs via leadership from the top. 
These changes have been used to attract pension fund funds and associated fees from ESG concerned 
savers and trustees. 
 
Those FMs who wish to adapt to the new pressures concerning ESG issues at at this strategic level, 
have to clarify their unique view on their trade–off  or balance sought between economic aims 
(maximise SWM and/or fees) and ESG aims. They will also have clarify their own views on the 
differing and conflicting ideas of ‘value’ arising from economic and ESG aims. They will have to 
make explicit the extent to which they intend to implement externally set codes, such as ethical codes 
or climate change policy. They have to make clear whether  they intend to exceed,  meet, or exploit 
such codes.  If they can communicate this within the FM firm, then sense making (Weick (1979, 
1995) during investment decisions can be influenced both by economic aims and agenda and by ESG 
aims and agenda. 
 
The grounded theory of FM also suggests that FM elements such as properties such as coherence, 
matching or knowledge have to be adapted so that more attention is paid to ESG issues and to the 
new external pressures. The coherence questions here are, how are the ESG (ethical, climate change) 
issues connected together through FM context and process in  a coherent way? How are SWM and 
ESG aims and agenda balanced in a formal way during the investment process?  The matching 
questions are, how does the adapted internal FM context and process (with new ESG knowledge 
dimensions) match the external demands of ESG oriented stakeholders, and how does it match the 
conventional investment universe and investing aims of the FM. Posing these questions is the first 
step to creating positive ESG change here. 
 
In terms of knowledge, FMs can, over time, adapt their conceptual frame for investment decision 
making. For example they could adapt their own theory of markets and behaviour to incorporate new 
views of how the market (for information, for stock pricing) includes (or does not include) such 
ethical, sustainability, and socially responsible issues in understanding and valuing companies (and 
sectors and whole economies). FMs could build on prior ESG related change and continue 
developing FM wide knowledge and skills concerning ethical behaviour in investee companies, and 
in the FM. They could further develop their FM knowledge on climate change issues, carbon tax and 
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value, and litigation risk. They could identify key companies and sectors with large changes expected 
on their business models and competitive position caused by ESG issues. These could include energy, 
mining, heavy energy use industries but could also include sectors such as banking and financial 
institutions.   
 
Knowledge creation requires formal learning about FM process and context knowledge by periodic 
internal reviews amongst FM teams. The FM could exploit codes and other external source to create 
in-house knowledge on ESG issues and use these to boost the education and training of staff on these 
matters. A critical area of FM knowledge and skills development concerns how to change FM 
process, organisation and context, to reduce ESG (ethical, climate change) problems and associated 
risk in investments. This will involve much of the human and structural intellectual capital identified 
above. The FM must also address how this knowledge can be integrated with prior FM knowledge 
based on economic aims (SWM, fee maximise). In this new ESG sensitive context, individuals have 
to learn how develop and defend their own ethical stance, and exploit ESG (ethical and climate 
change) and knowledge of their team, of their FM firm, to accelerate their own development. This 
will requires active discussions of ESG issues in formal and informal meetings in all teams and 
throughout the FM hierarchy. 
 
These forms of  pro-active changes in the properties of FM context and process to reflect ESG issues 
can create a more ESG sensitive context and process and can make sense making (Weick (1979, 
1995) in investment decisions more sensitive to these issues. High ‘scores’ for the strengths of these 
properties and hence high attention on ESG issues can provide a strong indication of future 
investment decisions being consistent with these issues. Such improved sensitivity to ESG issues can 
also help remove some of the bounded rationality constraints (Simon,1957)  imposed on FM.  Thus 
climate change issues such as the impact of carbon taxes or ethical issues such as the misuse of price 
sensitive information can become more explicit in investment decisions and in the FM formation of 
company value creation mosaics.  Raising the profile of ESG issues can also stimulate creativity by 
forcing FMs to consider novel ways of creating legitimate value. 
 
Changes in the internal operational context and decision process. 
 
If the above strategic change can be established, then FM top and middle management could consider 
changes to their own internal operational context. These operational changes could be manifest as 
further changes in FMs research focus, use of ESG research in decision process, and use of new 
decision criteria and heuristics to reflect key social, environmental and ethical issues.  Thus the FM 
firm and teams and individuals could make more use of their own or external research on 
sustainability, or social responsibility in company and sector wide business models. Attempts could 
be made to alter behaviour in FMs. Changes could be made to FM incentives schemes to reflect the 
FM firm balance sought between economic (SWM, fee) and ESG aims. This will involve changes in 
FM incentives at firm, team and individual levels to reflect ESG (ethical and climate change) issues 
and risks. Controls could be established on known areas of unethical behaviour as illustrated in 
table1.  
 
The next step in the strategy for change would be for FM management and front line FMs to consider 
changes to their internal investment decision processes such as stock selection and asset allocation.  
This area has been the historic focus of many ESG related changes enacted in FMs, especially in SRI 
(See Dunphy, Griffiths and Benn (2003), Sparkes and  Cowton  (2004), Bengtsson (2008), Gifford 
(2009),  as well as ‘Fair Pensions’ (October, 2009),  CERES (January, 2010) and the UKSIF/CIPFA 
survey, Winter 2010). ESG related change in investment decision processes, once enacted within a 
more coherent model of change concerning the wider FM context and process, is more likely to 
achieve FM aims concerning ESG issues.  
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For example, FM team managers and front line FM staff have adapted decision criteria and other 
aspects of investment decisions to reflect the FM trade–off or balance sought between SWM and 
ESG aims. They have taken  ESG issues directly into account in their decisions but have limited this 
practice if the actions and outcomes have led to increasing risk, lower return and lower value  (Fair 
Pensions’, 2009, CERES, 2010)  FMs have also built ESG rules and external codes into key 
investment steps such as screening, analysis, and valuation in stock selection.  Thus ESG criteria 
have been incorporated into existing FM criteria for screening out and screening in companies for 
potential investment. For example, large FMs such as Calpers evaluate investments according to 
company’s compliance with ILO Core Labour Standards and Global Sullivan Principles of CSR. The 
analysis process have established company business models to reflect ESG issues in economic 
transformation processes in key sectors. Valuation processes and models have been adapted to reflect 
ESG issues and their expected impact on company cash flows and their perceived riskiness.  
 
In addition use has been made of new decision criteria to stop FM investment in those firms that 
‘score’ very badly on ESG issues. Examples in stock selection include, companies that make ESG 
promises they never deliver, and tobacco, nuclear power, or ‘defence’ industries. More positive 
examples in asset allocation have included,  
• A fund must invest at least 20% of its capital in companies that are providing new solutions to 
climate change (new wind farms, energy conservation, energy efficiency ). 
• At least 30% in assets have to be in the top 25% of ‘carbon light’ companies in their sector, and 
the rest (50% or less) in companies that have shown ‘significant’ improvement in their carbon 
footprint over the past two years. 
 
Finally, in some cases FM top management have considered how such ESG changes impact on 
decision outputs at portfolio levels. This has involved changes  in portfolio monitoring and risk 
management  to answer the following questions 
• Where are the key ethical behaviour, and climate change risks (in FM, in companies, in markets) 
and where are key exposures and risks? In the portfolio? 
• Do they provide appropriate return for this level of risk and exposure? 
• Are these risks offset or diversified in other parts of the portfolio? 
• How do the new risk and returns contribute to overall performance? 
 
The grounded theory of FM indicates that the ongoing changes and proposed changes above to key 
areas of structure, process, and properties of FM, will also have a major impact on the collective 
dynamics of FM.  The intention of the above changes is to ensure that FMs (individuals, teams, 
management) become more sensitive to and more aware of ESG   issues and risks in the FM external 
context, internal context and  process. This is likely to increase the FM understanding  (at all levels) 
of the significance of the ESG.  FMs with strong ESG (ethical and climate change) purpose / aims, 
with higher ESG (ethical  and or climate change) properties to context, and with strengths in 
properties such as knowledge, coherence and matching, can interact with investment decision process 
in more forceful way. This can heighten the ESG dimension to the dynamics in FM structure and 
process, and ensures that ESG issues permeate the whole FM system and all of its interactions.  
 
Improving FM disclosure about (changes in) the invisible FM value creation process 
concerning ESG issues.  
 
The grounded theory of FM and the above proposed ESG changes to the invisible FM value 
creation process can be used to improve FM disclosure on these ESG matters. This requires 
FMs to use the above to alter various dimensions of FM disclosure to reflect ESG issues.  In 
particular this requires changes to the following areas of FM disclosure to reflect the above 
ESG changes 
 
 21 
• The full FM narrative and text  on the nature of the FMs core value creation process 
has to reflect ESG issue. This includes; 
• The how and why of their investment decisions  or, 
• The FM firm’s philosophy,  their investment policy, their stock selection (SL) and 
asset allocation (AL) processes, their  preferred  form of analysis  (eg  thematic, value 
or growth approach to analysis) in these decisions  
• The most recent Fund Performance  numbers relative to benchmark or absolute 
return target for the last Quarter, last year,  and period of time managing the contract 
(3-5 years) have to reflect ESG issue.  
• Short example narratives used to discuss historic performance in the past quarter 
and or year, and in the future period ahead. This example narrative has to reflect ESG 
issue and  includes 
• FM analysis about companies, markets and economies 
• FM analysis  of macro analysis, key sectors for value, key themes, examples on 
changing economic scenarios relative to these - how they had changed over the review 
period, and were changing at present and providing a focus for investment decisions 
• Case examples of successful stock selection and Asset allocation decisions, and some 
mistakes, explanations of relative to prior judgments and valuations. 
• Numeric examples to illustrate some of the above  
• FMs provided information on the attribution of the overall fund performance 
(backwards) to asset allocation and stock selection decisions  
• Discussions of forward or future views with the FM for  key stocks, sectors and 
economies and stock markets - next quarter, next 12 months has to reflect ESG issues 
and the proposed changes above 
 
The FM disclosure decision process connecting FM invisibles to visibles  is ‘more of an art 
than a science’, and as a ‘leap of faith’. However, the combination of the above is an 
important means to make this process more effective. Changing these to reflect ESG issues 
and the proposed ESG changes are means to overcome invisibility and act as a key framing 
means for users. They provide a plausible ‘explanatory and perceptual bridge’ linking the 
invisible FM investment process to the visible financial performance outcomes and ESG 
outcomes.  The full narrative, the sub narrative examples, additional numeric analyses, all 
reflecting ESG issue and proposed changes, are means to explain, signal, demonstrate or 
illustrate the FM’s value creation process. They provide insights into how the FM actually 
worked and how the FM (individual, team, and firm) conducted investment decision making.  
The combination is a key means to improve explanation of how stock selection and asset 
allocation led to fund performance and to achieving ESG aims.  
 
The above suggests that FMs can use the empirical patterns of FM value creation (as 
grounded theory of FM) and the proposed ESG changes to FM, as a common basis to 
structure new and formal reports to clients and trustees. If FMs can improve the quality of 
their disclosure of information on ESG (ethical and climate change) issues to trustees or 
clients during FM investment decisions, then this is likely to reduce the likelihood that ESG 
problems will occur. This can reduce the chances of FM misbehaviour . It can reduce the 
chances of clients experiencing major ESG surprises, related risks and the subsequent 
negative impact of this on FM reputation. As a result FMs have incentives to improve their 
communications to their own trustees or clients to explain FM policy for avoiding ESG 
(ethical and climate change) issues and associated risks in investing. 
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6. CHANGES ALONG THE ‘CHAIN OF ACCOUNTABILITY’ AND INCREASING ESG 
PRESSURES 
 
This section explores the possibilities for ESG change and an expanded information agenda for 
companies, FMs, and clients along the ‘Chain of accountability’ and in its immediate ‘market for 
information’ context.  The expanded information agenda is the means for FMs to exercise informed 
pressures on companies on ESG change issues. It is also the means for trustees to do the same with 
FMs. New ‘targets for change concerning information’ on the ‘chain of accountability’ involve 
improvements in corporate disclosure, FM disclosure, and in transparency to fund trustees. The 
information agenda along the chain of accountability can be improved by further developing current 
practices on the chain consisting of; private meetings and intense probing questioning, preferences 
for qualitative information, and the public disclosure of key ESG measures. This body of practice 
forms a reference point to adapt the private information agenda to wider ESG issues and to use this as 
a basis for improved public disclosure, informed pressure and accountability. New targets for change 
also include improvements to the wider information context of the ‘chain of accountability’. Change 
can be made to the ‘market for information’ concerning the production of ESG information for 
participants on the ‘chain of accountability’.  In particular changes can be made to disclosure 
practices, the functioning of rating agencies, and to the behaviour of sell side analysts.  
 
Such aggregate changes to the external context for FM, trustee and company decision making can 
help increase their individual and collective sensitivity to ESG issues. They can also make narrow 
‘investment society’ and the specialised ‘chain of accountability’ much more visible to larger civil 
society, to its wider accountability mechanisms, and to the larger institutional influence context.  The 
improved disclosure and transparency agenda is based on improved knowledge and understanding of 
the ‘chain of accountability’. Climate change issues will be used as an example of how to use this 
improved knowledge to expand the information and accountability agenda. 
 
Improving the quality of ESG information on the ‘chain of accountability’ 
 
The grounded theory of FM (Holland, 2010b) and other related research  (Hellman,1996;  Holland, 
2006) shows that many professional investors did not necessarily follow the single factor or multi 
factor models in the ‘new facts of finance’ (Cochrane, 2000).  This was especially true of the more 
qualitative less quantitative FMs. Their information needs were quite different and Holland and 
Doran (1998), Hellman (1996), Holland (2006) show that the focus of FM information acquisition 
involved intermediate corporate variables such as management quality, and the coherence of plans for 
succession and for corporate strategy. Changes in these were expected to have a direct impact on the 
company earnings, cash flows and other financial fundamentals (Holland, 2006). FMs sought to 
avoid downside risk in individual stocks and portfolio and information on intangibles such as 
management quality were used to assess downside risk. The grounded theory of FM and related 
research showed that such institutional investors also sought to understand; 
 
• How the company business model was made up, inter alia, of competitive strategies, plans, 
product mix, and human capital at the top. 
• How this related to a broad economic transformation process in the firm and its markets. 
• How various inputs were processed and led to company outputs consistent with strategy and 
product mix etc. 
• How this led to risky outcomes, cash flows and to new sources of value – the primary interest of 
investors  
 
The above patterns to FM qualitative information needs were specific to one part (the company-FM 
segment) of the ‘chain of accountability’. They were used to support the pursuit of a combination of 
FM economic aims such as SWM or fee maximisation. Given that trustees had similar investment 
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decisions to their FMs, their information needs were similar. They needed to have broader knowledge 
of investee companies and their value drivers. 
 
The above patterns to FM information needs, suggests that ESG qualitative information needs can be 
identified along the ‘chain of accountability’. For example, in the case of climate change issues it 
suggests that a relevant and expanded information agenda requires answers to the following 
questions. These are relevant to all participants along the ‘chain of accountability’.  
 
• What are the energy uses and GHG emissions in a company specific business model and 
economic transformation process? And are common in sectors? 
• What role do these energy uses and GHG emissions play in creating or destroying value as 
seen by shareholders operating in wealth oriented stock markets? 
• To what extent are / can the company reduce energy use and GHG emissions in absolute 
terms in its business model without reducing the value of the company and the wealth of 
investors? 
• How will proposed new actions to reduce energy uses and GHG in this specific company 
business model impinge on the generation of financial risks and returns at key locations in the 
model, and hence change the value of the company?  
• To what extent does the board and top management understand these issues and have adapted 
strategy, production, and products, to reflect these issues? 
 
• To what extent do institutional shareholders (such as FMs) understand these issues and have 
adapted stock selection, and portfolio construction to reflect these issues? (see the previous 
section in improved FM disclosure on the FM value creation process) 
• To what extent are shareholders willing to trade-off climate change benefit against portfolio 
wealth reductions? Risk increases? Liquidity reductions? (see the previous section in 
improved FM disclosure on the FM value creation process) 
 
• To what extent are clients, savers, pensioners and other users of institutional investor 
services willing to trade-off climate change benefits against portfolio wealth and liquidity 
reductions? And risk increases? 
 
If the information for the first five questions above can be disclosed by companies in a common and 
usable reporting format, and disclosed by FMs for the next two questions, then a clearer link can be 
established between shareholder and client defined value and GHG emissions and energy use in 
companies. 
 
This could also open up the possibilities of making more effective use of the current methods to 
measure and calculate GHG emissions. For example, the Carbon Disclosure project provides insights 
into the potential connections between corporate disclosure on GHG and investors’ information needs 
about value. The CDP provides information concerning absolute levels of energy use and GHG 
emissions. It also provides relative measures such as the ranked corporate carbon intensity score, or 
the emissions intensity of operational earnings. These measures do not necessarily connect climate 
change to value, and both absolute and relative measures, when used in isolation may be misleading 
about value implications. However, these types of information do create a relevant agenda for 
highlighting these issues during private meetings between companies and large institutional investors. 
It allows these actors to connect these issues to value or value changes by discussing them in the 
context of the corporate business model and competitive strategy. It allows these parties to probe and 
discuss these issues via the seven questions above.  
 
Private 1:1 meetings are the norm for most companies and occur just after the earnings figures are 
released (Holland, 2001). The expanded information agenda in the 1:1 is the means for FMs to 
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exercise informed pressures on companies on ESG change issues. The information from the CDP can 
help FM investors to make these climate change and value links in such meetings by asking 
companies the seven questions posed above.  The private 1:1 conversations about the agenda in the 
CDP and the questions above are likely to be far more effective in influencing FM stock selection 
and subsequent portfolio construction than broad sector GHG and energy use disclosures or 
measures. The private meetings and probing questions are also the point at which the fund manager 
can impose pressure on the board and top management to comply with good practice identified in the 
CDP. This could be the long term means for companies and institutional shareholders to learn how to 
marry questions of value, energy use and emissions in way that create possibilities for reducing 
climate change harm and possibly increase shareholder wealth. Research at the point of this private 
conversation could yield very interesting results.   
 
Improving the quality of ESG information in the ‘market for information’ context of the ‘chain 
of accountability’ 
 
Trustees, FMs and investee companies, can all exploit knowledge of the ‘market for information’ to 
enhance their common disclosure (transparency), governance and accountability agenda. The ‘Market 
for information’ includes companies, auditors, analysts, trustees, fund managers, consultants, rating 
agencies, media, regulators and others. Each market participant creates and exchanges their own 
unique outputs of information, advice, valuation, confidence, and assurance concerning target 
companies, fund managers and others. Trustees, FMs and companies purchase much information of 
relevance to their own specialist decisions and to ‘see how others see them’.  Considerable 
information is made public such as analyst forecasts for companies or rating agencies ratings of FMs 
or of corporate debt.  Much information is semi public and only circulates amongst professionals 
such as FMs, analysts and consultants. The latter includes consultant reports on FMs, and the rating 
of corporate top management and other intangibles.  Much information remains private such as 
consultant advice to trustees, or FM private exchanges with companies.  However the latter can leak 
into the professional domain through observation of trading behaviour (Holland, 2010a). 
 
Improvements can be made to the ‘market for information’ concerning the production of ESG 
information for participants on the ‘chain of accountability’.  In particular changes can be made to 
corporate disclosure practices, FM disclosure practices, the functioning of rating agencies, and to the 
behaviour of sell side analysts. Enhanced corporate disclosure to institutional investors and improved 
disclosure by institutional investors to clients or trustees are key areas for improving governance and 
accountability processes concerning ESG issues. For example, FMs can use the empirical patterns (of 
FM and the ‘chain of accountability’) discussed in sections 3 and 4 as a common basis to structure 
new and formal reports on  the changes they have made to adapt to ESG issues. These reports and 
changes could be externally audited and verified by rating agencies or consultants and this assurance 
disclosed in their public ratings and advice. Trustees and regulators will have actively demand such 
information before these agencies and FMs deliver improved disclosure practices.   
 
If FMs can improve the quality of their disclosure of information on ESG (ethical and climate 
change) issues to trustees or clients during FM investment decisions, then this is likely to reduce the 
likelihood that ESG problems will occur. This can reduce the chances of FM misbehaviour (adverse 
selection, moral hazard, bias, gaming etc). It can reduce the chances of clients experiencing major 
ESG surprises, related risks and the subsequent negative impact of this on FM reputation. As a result 
FMs have incentives to improve their communications to their own trustees or clients to explain FM 
policy for avoiding ESG (ethical and climate change) issues and associated risks in investing.  Bollen 
N P B (2007) shows that monthly volatility of investor cash flows is lower in socially responsible 
funds than in conventional funds and that investors derive utility from the socially responsible 
attribute, especially when returns are positive. FM firms can gain higher volume and more stable fee 
levels from such circumstances. They have incentives to behave in socially responsible way and to 
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ensure that investors are aware of these fund characteristics. This means communicating this in an 
effective manner to the ‘market for information’ and ensuring information, advice, and assurance 
products concerning ESG issues in FMs are of the  highest quality. 
 
FM rating agencies use their own conceptual frameworks to conduct their analysis of FM from the 
conventional shareholder wealth perspective. These frameworks are likely to bear some similarity to 
the grounded theory of FM. Qualitative ratings for FMs are based on  rating agency specific 
frameworks and these are used to provide a narrative explanation of quantitative FM performance 
rankings. The grounded theory of FM and the ESG change strategy  for FMs developed here could be 
used as the means for regulators to discuss with rating agencies how they could adapt their 
conceptual frameworks to rate FMs from ethical, sustainability, and socially responsible finance 
perspectives. Qualitative ratings based on the elements identified in the grounded theory of  FM 
could reflect specific issues (say ethics) or all of the major ESG issues. The emergence of public 
rankings and reports for all major FMs on ESG issues, based on a common framework, could act as a 
major stimulus to the ‘market for information’ and its information, advice, and assurance products 
concerning  FMs.  
 
Sell side analyst have emerged in the past decade to provide research on how companies deal with 
ESG issues. Qualitative rating systems already exist amongst analysts for intangible corporate value 
creation elements (Holland, 2009) such as the quality of top management, and coherence of strategy 
etc. These conventional ratings for SWM purposes could be adapted for corporate ESG issues.  Adam 
and Shavit (2008) discuss how rating of companies for corporate social responsibility (CSR) can 
offer an incentive for firms to invest on CSR. The Carbon Disclosure Project (2010) collects 
information from the board and top management of investee companies about company energy uses 
and how the company identifies and takes action to reduce its green house gas emissions. This 
information is used to construct a ‘Carbon disclosure leader’s index’ for companies and sectors. 
Bloombergs, MSCI, and Thompson Reuters (Asset4) produce ESG indicators for large numbers of 
large public companies. FMs can integrate these ESG indicators into their conventional financial 
analysis for the companies. Large investment banks now compete on their company sustainability 
research and their research is ranked by Extel in their SRI/Sustainability survey (Shepherd, 2010).  
Investment consultants such as Mercer, Towers Watson, and Hewitt Associates have their own 
responsible investment specialists. The emergence of such information providers and the public 
rankings and indicators for all major firms on ESG issues has acted as a major stimulus to the 
functioning of the  ‘market for information’ .  
If the ‘market for information’ can be improved in this way then FMs can improve their governance 
of companies and trustees can improve their governance of FMs. For example, FMs could also use 
the enhanced information flows to improve their own governance of companies concerning ESG 
issues. They can make use of close relations with their investee companies to probe and understand 
ESG issues arising in their business models. Climate change was used as an example of this 
possibility in the previous section. This extends the private governance approach discussed in 
Holland (2001, 2002). Becht et al (2009) analyse private engagements by an activist fund and find it 
substantially outperforms benchmarks. They estimate that abnormal returns are largely associated 
with engagements rather than stock picking.  FMs can exploit such established intervention 
possibilities by exploring how investee companies respond to ESG issues at Board and top 
management levels via strategy and asset changes, and how they disclose these changes. They can 
also engage with companies to actively promote positive ESG (say ethical) behaviour, and they can 
alter their AGM voting to reflect above issues. These range of actions, if co-ordinated within a 
coherent ESG change strategy  can be more effective than sporadic, uncoordinated change and action. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to explore trustee, FM and company change concerning environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) issues. It has also sought to expand and develop the accountability agenda and 
accountability processes concerning these actors and ESG issues. Many problems exist and can create 
barriers to change and to trustee, FM and company accountability concerning ESG issues. This paper 
argued that Trustees, FM investors, and investee companies, all require shared knowledge to 
overcome problems of fragmented change and of behaviour. The shared knowledge or conceptual 
framework developed in the paper, constituted an analytic framework (relevant literature and theory), 
the empirically based patterns (for FM and the ‘chain of accountability’), and the strategy for ESG 
change (targets and pathways). This can form a body of shared knowledge between trustees, FMs and 
investees companies that can be used to create favourable conditions for ‘Intelligent Accountability’ 
as espoused by O’Neil (2002). These can create more effective mechanism to bring about radical 
change in FM relative to environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. 
This paper offers operational means for trustees of ethical or socially responsible funds, consultants 
and others to argue for variation in the aims, structure, process, actions and behaviour of FMs to 
reflect  wider social and ethical viewpoints as well as conventional SWM aims.  Clients and trustees 
of say a pension fund can use the new conceptual framework to enhance trustee governance of FMs 
holding their funds, and to encourage the same FMs in turn to enhance their governance or 
stewardship role with investee firms. Clients and trustees can use the conceptual framework to pose 
coherent and connected questions about FM context and process elements, their properties and 
strengths, and how FMs have delivered financial performance and satisfied the conventional wealth 
creation agenda. The trustee mandate or contract with FMs can also be adapted (by using the 
conceptual framework) to include institutional shareholders codes for ‘good’ corporate governance 
by FMs. (eg The Institutional Shareholder Committee UK, 16th Nov 2009) 
 
The above analysis illustrates how new concepts of accountability and of fruitful conditions for 
accountability are required (O’Neill, 2001). If the problems of deficient knowledge (of FM,  the 
'chain of accountability,  the possibilities for ESG change) and their  contribution to the problems of 
invisibility  and lack of transparency are not dealt with by fund trustees, FMs, and investee 
companies, then these problems will remain whether the issues are about wealth creation,  ESG 
issues or both.   
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